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We present a discrete-time version of an otherwise standard Schumpeterian 
growth model. Unlike continuous-time models, with discrete time models, linear 
production functions for probabilities make no sense as they imply probabilities greater 
than one for sufficiently high inputs. 
We show that in discrete time is possible for more than one firm to innovate 
simultaneously.  How the profits are divided in the case of these ties is critical for 
aggregate behavior.  Both a monopolist and a group of potential Bertrand competitors 
value an additional unit of R&D input only to the extent that it will succeed where all 
other inputs in the industry fail.  Potentially collusive firms place the same value, but also 
value the success of their own inputs, even if another firm also succeeds. 
This has implications for the choice a modeling framework.  If ties are prevalent, 
models with linear functions for R&D in continuous time, while tractable, will miss 
important behavior.  We present evidence consistent with ties being prevalent in many 
industries. 
In general equilibrium, where all prices are endogenously determined, the amount 
of R&D undertaken by a group of firms that engage in Bertrand competition when there 
is a tie is less than the amount undertaken if there is a single R&D firm. 
In general equilibrium, the amount of R&D undertaken by a group of firms that 
colludes when there is a tie is greater than the amount undertaken if there is a single R&D 
firm. 
 1 
1  Introduction 
 
Schumpeterian growth arises from the research and development (R&D) activities 
of innovators pursuing the monopoly rents that accrue to new proprietary technologies.  
There is a large and insightful literature on Schumpeterian growth, including papers by 
Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Segerstrom, Anant and 
Dinopoulos (1990).  However, the Schumpeterian growth literature has thus far ignored 
the effects of post-innovation market structure when several innovators can be successful 
at once, that is, when ties are possible.  It is easy to understand why: in the continuous 
time models that are typical in this literature, the probability of a tie is infinitesimal.  
Arguably, this ignores an important aspect of reality.  R&D projects take time, and that 
time is naturally identified with the length of a discrete time period.  If the period length 
is substantial then simultaneous (that is, same period) discoveries of similar innovations 
are likely to be common.
1 
Whether the additional complexity of modeling ties is worthwhile depends on 
how important they are empirically.  If they rarely occur in the real world, then there is 
little to be lost in using continuous time models and the fact that their solutions are more 
tractable makes them very attractive.  However, if ties occur frequently then the 
tractability may not be worth the cost. 
We use data on markups and on the average growth rates of Solow residuals from 
Phillips (1993) to examine the importance of ties.  The data are at the two-digit SIC level.  
Assume these industries grow in discrete jumps of size θ, equal to the gross markups, 
with constant probabilities, ρ.  We can solve for the probabilities of success in R&D by 
using  ) 1 ( − = θ ρ g . 
Table 1 presents the values of µ and θ for the sixteen industries where markups 
are greater than one and the implied values for ρ.  Given ρ, we can calculate the 
probability of a tie given an innovation occurs, assuming J equally sized firms.  This is 
                                                 
1 A famous example of such a tie might be the simultaneous introduction of VHS and Beta video cassette 
recording technologies.  Closer to home, readers of academic literature can probably think of numerous 
examples of similar ideas being published at about the same time. 2 
reported in the last column of Table 1 for various values of J.  The results show that ties 
are likely to empirically important for most industries. 
 
The remainder of the paper explores a discrete time, infinite-horizon model that is 
analogous to the continuous time models that dominate the Schumpeterian growth 
literature.  Sections 2-4 respectively describe the three sectors of the model economy: 
innovators, producers, and consumers.  Producers employ labor in the production of a 
consumption good with the current technology.  In each period J innovators come into 
existence and employ labor with the goal of discovering a labor-saving technology and 
supplanting the current producer or producers. 
Section 5 presents partial equilibrium analysis, assuming the industry is small 
enough to take wages and interest rates as given.  Curiously, aggregate R&D is the same 
when J>1 and ties result in (profit-dissipating) Bertrand behavior as when J=1.  The 
distribution of R&D across J>1 innovators is indeterminate.  Of course, such 
indeterminacies are common in constant-returns-to-scale models, but ours is not such a 
model. In discrete time, the probability of success cannot be globally linear in inputs.  So 
the source of the indeterminacy must lie elsewhere.  We introduce a notion, called 
constant returns to duplication, that is interpretable as having innovators decide how 
many independent experiments they are going to run simultaneously during the period.  
In the Bertrand case, an additional experiment is of value to an innovator only if it 
succeeds when all other experiments fail.  This is true whether the innovator or its 
competitors are conducting the other experiments; indeed it is true whether or not the 
innovator has competitors.  Since the marginal value of an experiment depends only on 
the number of experiments and not on which innovators are running them, the total 
equilibrium number of experiments is independent of the number of innovators.  Thus, in 
parital equilibrium, the Bertrand case yields the same level of R&D as the monopoly case.  
By contrast, if ties result in collusive behavior or, equivalently, if a monopoly is 
randomly granted to one of the successful (risk-neutral) firms, then the results differ from 
the Bertrand case.  In the collusive case an experiment has value whenever it is successful, 
so the aggregate number of experiments is higher than in the Bertrand case.  In summary, 
if the number of innovators exceeds one, allowing collusion induces higher growth. 3 
Section 6 extends the analysis of Section 5 with a simple general equilibrium 
model that makes wages and interest rates endogenous.  If J>1, the real wage depends on 
whether there was a tie in the previous period because of the effect on market structure in 
the output market.  As a result, the equivalence of Bertrand and monopolistic behavior 
does not carry over from the partial equilibrium scenario.  Section 6 also considers the 
welfare properties of the various market structures.  As in the previous literature – see, 
for example, Aghion and Howitt (1998) – welfare effects are ambiguous.  In all cases 
growth may be either too rapid or too slow, so it may or may not be optimal to allow 
collusion to increase the growth rate.  Simulations suggest that, for reasonable parameters, 
the Bertrand outcome exhibits insufficient growth, suggesting that allowing collusion in 
the event of ties may be welfare-enhancing.  Indeed, growth is substantially increased 
toward – but not beyond – the optimum even if there are only two innovators.  There is 
an optimal number of innovators such that allowing collusion yields growth close to the 
socially optimal level.  This optimal number of innovators is rather small.  Finally, the 
welfare loss is asymmetric in the sense that the loss associated with allowing collusion 
and overshooting the optimal number of innovators by as much as nearly a thousand is 
significantly smaller than the loss associated with imposing Bertrand competition. 
Section 7 contains some concluding remarks. 
 
2  Innovators 
Consider an industry that uses labor to produce a consumption good.  There are 
countably infinitely many time periods indexed by the positive integers.  The prevailing 
technology in period t is characterized by its (constant) output per worker,  0 > t A .  At the 
beginning of each period J≥1 innovators are born.  The innovators employ labor in hopes 
of discovering a new technology characterized by output per worker of  t A θ  where θ>1.  
If an innovator hires l   workers, it has a probability  ) (l ρ   of discovering the new 
technology.  Successful innovators (if any) cease research and begin production in period 
t+1.  Unsuccessful innovators cease to exist. 
A constant returns to scale assumption is widely imposed in the Schumpeterian 
growth literature.  Specifically, it is assumed that ρ is homogeneous of degree one over 4 
input levels satisfying  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ ρ .  Of course, constant returns cannot hold globally 
because ρ is bounded above by one.  On the other hand, the intuition behind constant 
returns – that proportional increases in inputs should lead to (at least) a proportional 
increase in output – is compelling.  We reconcile this logic with its failure to hold 
globally when applied to ρ by taking the view that it is misleading to think of ρ as a 
typical production function.  In our view, R&D underwrites experiments which may be 
successful or unsuccessful.  It is then natural to assume that an increase in inputs results 
in a proportional increase in the number of experiments underwritten.  The properties of 
ρ can then be deduced from the properties of the stochastic outcomes of the experiments.  
The length of a time period is naturally identified with the time required to run an 
experiment, and the innovator’s choice of labor dictates how many experiments it can run 
simultaneously. 
A natural analog to constant returns to scale, which we call constant returns to 
duplication, posits that all experiments have the same required labor input and the same 
(independent) probabilities of success.  Let φ be the amount of labor required to conduct 
one experiment.  Then the number of successes in x experiments (requiring labor input of 
φ x = l ) is binomially distributed.  As is well known, this distribution is approximately a 
Poisson distribution if φ is small.  Specifically, if an innovator hires l units of labor, the 
probability that it has at least one success – and hence discovers the new technology – is 
l l
κ ρ
− − = e 1 ) ( , where κ>0. 
Now consider the problem facing each of the J innovators in each period t.  Let 
jt l   be the labor employed by innovator j in period t, let  ) ,..., ( 1 Jt t t l l l = , let jt − l be   t l  
with the j
th element  removed, and let  ,...) , (
~
2 1 1 + + + = t t t l l l .
2  Given (possibly stochastic) 
sequences of wage rates  ,...) , ( ~
2 1 1 w w w =   and interest rates  ,...) , ( ~
2 1 1 r r r = , a Nash 
equilibrium for innovators is a sequence  ,...) , (
~
2 1 1
e e e l l l =  such that, for all innovators j in 
all time periods t, 
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jt t j + − + l l ν  is the expected present value of the profit stream – discounted to 
period  t – associated with introducing an innovation in period t+1.  The first order 
condition associated with (2.1) – assuming an interior solution – is 






jt t j w e l l
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κ  (2.2) 
Note that  1 , + t j ν  depends on
e
jt − l because this determines how many competitors the 
successful innovator can expect to face, that is, how many other successful innovators 




+ l  because this determines 
how long the successful innovator in period t will enjoy the lead in technology.  The 
properties of  1 , + t j ν  will be derived below. 
 
3  Producers 
In each period, t, producers – that is, the most recently successful innovators – 
enjoy a state-of-the-art technology with constant marginal cost t t A w / .  Producers 
simultaneously choose prices to maximize current profits.  They face competition from 
each other as well as from one or more of the previous producers that have the next oldest 
technology with marginal cost  t t A w / θ , where θ>1.  If in period t there is a single 
producer, or if there are several producers who can collude, they charge the previous 
producers’ marginal cost.
3 This keeps the previous producers out of the market and earns 
aggregate profit of  θ θ θ π / ) 1 ( / ) 1 ( t t t t t t C P A C w − = − = , where  t C   is the quantity 
demanded.  By contrast, if there are several producers who are unable to collude, they 
charge their own marginal cost,  t t t A w P / = , and earn aggregate profit  0 = t π  in  the 
resulting Bertrand equilibrium.  Producers in the aggregate employ  t t t A C N / ≡  units of 
labor. 
The properties of  1 , + t j ν  , the expected present value of the profit stream associated 
with introducing an innovation in period t+1, can now be described.  A successful 
innovator in period t has the most efficient technology in period t+1 with probability 
                                                 
3 This assumes that profits are increasing in price below  t t A w / θ .  Such is the case given the assumptions 
about consumers imposed below. 6 
1 1 = + t γ .  Thereafter, the probability that its technology remains the most efficient in 
period  τ conditional on having been the most efficient in period τ -1 equals the 


























Thus, conditional on being successful, an innovator discounts profits in period s 
back to period t by the factor 
∏









which incorporates the probability of survival as well as the interest rate. 
When J=1, if the sole innovator in period t is successful it becomes a monopolist 
until it is supplanted by a new successful innovator.  The associated value of  1 + t ν  – to be 
denoted 
s
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s
t A C w θ δ ν  (3.1) 
When  J>1, R&D ties sometimes occur.  Suppose, given a tie, successful 
innovators become Bertrand competitors thereafter.  A successful innovator in period t 
enjoys no unless all other innovators fail.  This probability is 
it j i it e e j i
l l ≠ Σ − −
≠ = Π
κ κ .  Thus 
in this case, the value  1 , + t j ν  – to be denoted 
b










1 1 , / ) 1 (
t s
t s s s
b
t j A C w e
it j i θ δ ν
κ l  (3.2) 
Finally, suppose successful innovators collude ex post and that each has an equal 
share of the monopoly profit until a new technology is discovered.  Then the value  1 , + t j ν  
– to be denoted 
c
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α ν  (3.3) 
                                                 
4 Although 
b
t v 1 +  can differ across firms, since firms may invest different amounts, the firm subscript is 
suppressed to simplify notation, and similarly for α(j) below. 7 
where α(U) is the probability that the set of successful innovators is U, 2
J-1 denotes the 
collection of subsets of innovators that do not include j, and #U is the number of 
successful innovators in set U.  Note that 
c
t j 1 , + ν  can also be interpreted as the expected 
discounted payoff from successful innovation if a monopoly position – e.g. a patent – is 
granted randomly to one of the successful innovators. 
 
4  Consumers 
In each period, t, consumers divide their current income between consumption Ct, 
and savings in the form of a full set of Arrow-Debreu assets.  Let  it Q  denote the holdings 
of asset i in period t, purchased in period t-1.  With J independent R&D firms each either 
succeeding or failing there are 
2 J different states of nature.  Consumers’ current income 
is comprised of the wage for their one unit of inelastically supplied labor, w t, and the 




1 = Σ . 
Taking the stochastic sequence of wage rates, interest rates, output prices, and 
profits as given, consumers choose consumption and investments each period to 






= Σ β , subject to the 
constraint that current expenditures on consumption and savings must equal current 















it it t t t Q q Q d w C P  
where the dit denotes the payoff of one unit of asset i in period t and the qit denotes its 
price. 
Subject to well-known regularity conditions, the consumers’ problem can be 
solved recursively using the Bellman equation: 
)]} , ( [ { ) ( max ) , ( 1 1
1
+ + + =
+
t t t t t V E C U V
t
Ω Q Ω Q
Q
β  




i it t Q = ≡ Q  and Ωt is the information set used to 
form expectations in period t.  Standard dynamic programming techniques yield the 
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1 β  (4.1) 
In interest of tractability and comparability with the rest of the literature, we 
follow the common practice of restricting attention to the utility function 
) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) (
1 σ
σ − − =
−
t t C C U  where  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ σ . 
The market discount factor,  r + 1
1 , is the intertemporal price of one unit of 
consumption tomorrow in terms of one unit of consumption today.  Purchasing one of 
each available Arrow-Debreu assets gives exactly one unit of consumption with certainty.  





































5  Partial Equilibrium 
Consider a partial equilibrium model of a single R&D race where current wages 
are exogenous to the industry.  A successful innovation by only one firm at time t will 
yield a stream of expected monopoly profits, 
m
t 1 + ν , beginning in period t+1.  With only 







κl  (5.1) 
Solving this for ℓt gives the amount of labor hired given the wage rate, wt, the 
value of future profits, 
m


















If more than one firm engages in R&D (i.e. J>1) and ties result in Bertrand 
competition in the product market, then a firm receives the stream of monopoly profits if 
and only if it is the only firm to innovate.  In this case (2.2) becomes 
w e e e
i j i i j i j m
t = − +
≠ ≠ Σ −
+
Σ − − ] 0 ) 1 ( ) [( 1
l l l κ κ κ ν κ , where  ) 1 (
i j i e
l ≠ Σ − −
κ   is the probability that at 







κ  (5.2) 9 
where  j j L l Σ =  is the aggregate employment by all R&D firms. 
Surprisingly, equations (5.1) and (5.2) yield the same aggregate employment, 
since  L = l when there is only one R&D firm.  Thus, a monopolistic innovator will hire 
the same amount of R&D as a group of innovators that expect to engage in Bertrand 
competition if there is an R&D tie.  Intuitively, all firms value an additional unit of labor 
only to the extent that it will succeed where all other units fail.  For the monopolistic 
innovator this is because it owns any success from all other units anyway.  For a member 
of a group this is because any success from units it does not own results in zero profits 
due to competition. 
 
6  Simple General Equilibrium 
A general equilibrium is a list of stochastic sequences 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1










q Q π w P r C N l   such that, for all t and all realizations of the stochastic 
process, (1)  1
~ l is Nash equilibrium for innovators, (2)  1
~ C and 1
~ Q solve the consumers’ 
problem, (3) the full employment conditions  1 = + t t L N   are satisfied, (4) the credit 
market clearing conditions, that Qit equal profits in state t+1 and state i for all t and i, are 
satisfied, and (5) the output price sequence  1
~ P  and the profit sequence 1
~ π  are derived as 
described above. 
As is generally (though not universally
5) the case in the Schumpeterian growth 
literature, we restrict attention to stationary equilibria.  Consumption rises over time as 
new technologies are discovered.  Let output in the first period be numeraire; that is 
1 1 = P .  The nature of equilibrium depends on the assumptions imposed on the market 
structure.  We again consider three structures: (1) a single innovator, (2) multiple 
innovators that dissipate profits through Bertrand competition if more than one is 
successful, and (3) multiple innovators that successfully collude if more than one is 
successful.  Of course, the first structure is a special case of either of the latter two.  We 
refer to these, respectively, as the monopoly case, the Bertrand case, and the collusive 
case. 
                                                 
5 See Deissenberg and Nyssen (1998). 10 
 
6.1  Single Innovator 
When  J=1, the successful innovator always becomes a monopolist.  Posit a 
stationary equilibrium with a constant interest rate, r, and a constant output price, P=1.  















for all t.  Given an innovation in period t, consumption will be constant at Ct+1 until 

























for all t. Now, by the definition of the output production function and the labor market 
clearing condition, 
) 1 ( 1 1 L A C t t − = + +  
for all t.  Substituting the previous three relationships into the innovator’s first order 
condition (2.2) and manipulating transforms it into 
r L e
L + = − − +
− 1 )] 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 [ θ θ κ
κ  (6.1) 
 
Equation (4.1) in this case is 




− + = t t C E r C  
In a stationary equilibrium this implies 
)] 1 ( )[ 1 ( 1 ρ ρθ β
σ − + + =
− r  
This and the definition of ρ imply 




= + − − σ κ θ β
L e
r  (6.2) 
Now (6.1) and (6.2) provide two equations in r and L. The former exhibits r 
decreasing in L while the latter exhibits r increasing in L.  The unique solution will exist 
with L>0 if  β β θ κθ / ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − ≥ − .  The left side of this condition reflects the expected 
profitability of research while the right side reflects the degree to which future profits are 
discounted.  Thus, if the likelihood of success (reflected in κ) and the gain from 11 
innovation (reflected in θ) are sufficiently high and the future is not discounted too 
heavily (as reflected in β) then equilibrium will exhibit positive investment in research.  
Otherwise, L = 0 in equilibrium and only (6.2) is satisfied, yielding no growth and an 
interest rate equal to the rate of time preference.  The equilibrium values of the other 
variables can be derived in a straightforward manner. 
 
6.2  Multiple Innovators: Bertrand 
When J>1 R&D ties will sometimes occur.  When they do the structure of the 
equilibrium depends on producer behavior.  This subsection assumes that multiple 
producers dissipate profits through Bertrand competition.  Production in this case is 
greater than that with only one producer.  This leads to cycles of monopoly and 
competition in the production sector which do not exist in the other market arrangements 
we consider. 
Posit a stationary equilibrium exhibiting interest rates, r
M and r
C  where the 
superscript M denotes a variable’s value when there is a monopoly producer and a C 
denotes its value when production is competitive.  As before, posit a constant output price, 
P=1.
  When a period-t innovator, say innovator j, is the only successful firm, it enjoys 
monopoly profits until it is supplanted.  In this case the output price satisfies 
1 / 1 1 1 = = + + + t
M
t t A w P θ . 
If it is not the only successful firm, it and its Bertrand competitors will dissipate their 
profits by charging an output price (normalized to one) of 
6 
1 / 1 1 1 = = + + + t
C
t t A w P  
Now, since consumption will be constant at Ct+1 for as long as the successful 
period-t innovator is not supplanted, and since positive profits only accrue if innovator j 
is the only successful firm, (3.2) reduces to 


































for all t.  By the definition of the output production function and the labor market clearing 
condition, 
                                                 
6 Since output is numeraire, the increased competition is reflected in a higher nominal wage, rather than a 
lower nominal output price. 12 
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for all t.  Substituting the previous four relationships into the innovator’s first order 
condition (2.2) and manipulating yields 
M M L r L e
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ρ
θ κ
κ  (6.4) 
There are two conditions because R&D employment and interest rates are 
different when current producers compete than it is when there is only one producer.  
Note that (6.3) & (6.4) only determine aggregate R&D employment, the distribution of 
investment across innovators is indeterminate.  Of course, such indeterminacies are 
common in general equilibrium models with constant returns to scale, but this is not such 
a model.  Intuitively, an innovator’s marginal experiment is of value if and only if it 
succeeds when all other experiments fail.  This is true whether the innovator or its 
competitors are conducting the other experiments; indeed as illustrated in section 5, it is 
true whether or not the innovator has competitors.  We assume below that all R&D firms 
are equally sized:  J Lm mj / = l ,  J Lc cj / = l for all i 
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C L C e
κ ρ
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− − − − ≡  
Equations (6.3) - (6.6) provide four equations in 
C M C M r r L L & , , .   Appendix 1 
shows that this set of equations implies 
C M L L >  and 
C M r r > .  Intuitively, when 
production is competitive, the real wage is higher than when there is a monopoly.  This 
leads to a substitution of labor away from R&D and into production. 
 
6.3 Multiple Innovators: Collusion 
Now suppose that when multiple innovators are successful they collude and split 
the monopoly profits equally.  Posit a stationary equilibrium with an interest rate of r, a 13 
constant output price, P = 1, and symmetric investment,  j J L j ∀ = / l .  Then, since the 















for all t.  Since consumption will be constant at Ct+1 for as long as the successful period-t 
innovators are not supplanted, (3.3) reduces to 
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Finally, 
) 1 ( 1 1 L A C t t − = + +  





− − − −
− +
− − − − − + = +
1
0




1 / ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1
J
i




J L L e e L e e r
κ κ κ κ θ θ κ  (6.7) 
Of course, when J=1, this corresponds to the monopoly case.  The summed term 
is the expected inverse of the number of an innovator’s successful competitors, and is 
declining in L.  Thus the r satisfying (6.7) is declining in L. 
The consumer’s Euler equation is the same as the monopoly case (6.2) and is 
reproduced here as (6.8). 




= + − − σ κ θ β
L e
r  (6.8) 
Equilibrium values of L and r solve (6.7) and (6.8).
7  If there is a solution to (6.7) 
and (6.8) – that is, if  β β θ κθ / ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − ≥ − – then there is a unique stationary equilibrium 
and it exhibits a positive level of investment; otherwise, the unique stationary equilibrium 
exhibits no investment in R&D.  
Appendix 2 shows that L is larger when J>1 than when J=1.  Since J=1 is the case 
of a single innovator we examined above, it follows that more aggregate R&D labor is 
hired with multiple innovators if collusive production is expected.  
                                                 
7 As before, L in equilibrium iff  β β θ κθ / ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − ≥ − . 14 








α is declining in J, that an increase in the number of innovators J decreases 
J L/ = l : faced with more competitors, each innovator invests less.
8  
 
6.4   A social planner’s problem 
Let ,...} , , { 1
2
1 1 A A A θ θ = A  be the set of attainable technology levels.  A stationary 
social plan is a function  ] 1 , 0 [ : → A λ  that assigns a level of investment to each level of 
technology.  Define the social planner’s problem as choosing a stationary social plan to 















subject to the constraint that  ] 1 , 0 [ ) ( ∈ A λ  for all  A ∈ A .  Let  ) , ( λ A W  be the expected 
present value of implementing the plan λ if the current technology is A.  Note that the 
choice of utility function implies  ) , ( ) ' , (
1 λ θ λ θ
σ A W A W
− =  if  ) ( ) ( ' A A λ θ λ =  for  all 
A ∈ A .  Let  ) , ( max ) ( λ λ A W A V = .  Standard continuity and compactness arguments 
imply that  ) (A V  is well defined if 
σ βθ
− >
1 1 , that is, if the maximal growth rate isn’t too 
large relative to the rate of time preference.  It follows from the properties of W and the 
optimality of V that  ) ( ) (
1 A V A V
σ θ θ
− = .  Let λ
* be an optimal stationary plan.  Then, for 
any  A ∈ A  , standard recursive arguments imply 
[ ] ) ( ))) ( ( 1 ( ) ( )) ( ( ))] ( 1 ( [ ) (
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1
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Since ) (A V  is maximal,  ) (
* A λ  must maximize it for all A.  Differentiating  ) (A V  
with respect to
* λ , setting the result equal to zero, and manipulating it yields 
[] {}
1
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 (
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8 Graphically, an increase in J shifts (6.4) and (6.5) to the left in ℓ – (1+r) space, illustrating the result 15 
Note that the left side of (6.9) is strictly decreasing in  ) (
* A λ , implying a unique 
optimal level of investment.  Note also that the optimal level of investment is 
independent of A, that is, the social planner would optimize by choosing the same value 
for L in every period. 
Unfortunately, (6.9) cannot be explicitly solved for the optimal L for purposes of 
comparison with the outcomes discussed in previous sections.  Numerical simulations are 
tractable however.  The next section presents some examples. 
 
7  Some numerical simulations 
It is well known that Schumpeterian growth models can exhibit either insufficient, 
optimal, or excessive growth relative to the social optimum.  (See, for example, Aghion 
and Howitt (1998).)  The intuition is compelling.  On the one hand, successful innovators 
raise the entire future trajectory of the economy, but enjoy profits only until supplanted; 
this suggests growth rates will be too slow.  On the other hand, successful innovators 
destroy the profitability of current producers, a social loss that innovators do not 
internalize; this suggests that growth rates will be too high.  Either effect may dominate.   
An implication of our analysis is that the welfare properties of equilibrium also 
depend on market structure.  If there are at least two innovators, and if growth is 
insufficient in the Bertrand case, it can be increased toward (and even beyond) the 
optimal rate by allowing collusion.  If growth is too high in the Bertrand case, allowing 
collusion worsens the problem.  To provide a feel for the possible magnitudes of these 
effects, some simulations are reported in Table 2.  For various parameter values, the table 
compares the social optimum, the monopoly outcome, Bertrand outcomes for various 
numbers of innovators, and the collusive outcome with the same numbers.  In each 
simulation, imposing Bertrand competition in the case of ties substantially reduces 
growth below the social optimum.  Further it reduces it below the level found in the 
monopoly case.  Growth is significantly increased by allowing collusion even if there are 
only two innovators.  In the last section we illustrate a case where collusion can even lead 
to R&D levels higher than the social optimum. 
 
8  Concluding Remarks 16 
This paper has argued that post-innovation market structure matters in discrete-
time Schumpeterian growth models.  Having a single innovator yields a socially 
suboptimal level of R&D and a growth rate that is too low.  When the probability of 
simultaneous discoveries is non-negligible, having more than one innovator lowers 
aggregate growth rates if profits are dissipated by Bertrand competition in the event of a 
tie.  By contrast, having multiple innovators can increase growth if they are allowed to 
collude in the event of a tie.  The increased growth rate, which comes at the cost of 
additional R&D expenditures, may or may not be welfare improving, but simulations 
suggest that allowing collusion may get it wrong by less than prohibiting collusion does.  
The results of R&D ties are usually not identical patents.  We have modeled 
innovation as a discovery that lowers the cost of producing goods.  It is just as easy to 
interpret innovation as an increase in quality of goods produced while cost remains 
constant.  When ties occur in quality improvements the result will most likely be goods 
that are imperfect substitutes.  In this case, the monopoly rents would not be completely 
dissipated and our results from the collusion case would apply. 
Even if ties result in identical goods, however, it is possible that the collusive case 
is still the most relevant if patents are granted to only one firm.  For example, if 
simultaneous discoveries are awarded to the first firm in line at the patent office, or by 
some random process, then the expected reward from a tie will be non-zero and the 
collusive case applies. 17 
Appendix 1 
Multiple Innovators: Bertrand 
 
We have four equations, (6.3) – (6.6) in four unknowns, 
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It is easy to see that this implies A=1<θ. 
 
Next, suppose 
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Since  1 <
−σ θ , we have A<1<θ. 
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Hence it must be that 
C M L L > . 
 
In this case, 
C M








L , so D
C and D
M above are both negative. 
This, in turn, implies that 
C M r r > . 19 
Appendix 1 
Multiple Innovators: Collusion 
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With J=1 A=0 and this reduces to (6.1) from the single innovator case 
For a given level of L, 1+r is higher in the case where J>1 than when J=1. 
Since r is decreasing in L for (6.7) and increasing in L for (6.8), moving from J=1 to J>1 
will result in an increase in equilibrium L.  As illustrated below: 
 





















20  Food 2.16% 1.48  4.49% 1.15% 1.83%  2.06% 2.26%
22  Textile mill products  3.76% 1.06 62.64% 24.13% 35.10%  38.29% 40.99%
23  Apparel & other textiles  2.22% 1.06 37.08% 11.53% 17.63%  19.53% 21.20%
24  Lumber & wood products  2.13% 1.10 21.29% 5.98% 9.34%  10.43% 11.39%
25  Furniture & fixtures  1.47% 1.10 14.68% 3.97% 6.25%  6.99% 7.65%
26  Paper 2.10% 1.30  7.01% 1.82% 2.89% 3.24% 3.55%
28  Chemicals 3.55% 3.12  1.67% 0.42% 0.67% 0.76% 0.83%
29  Petroleum 2.69% 1.15  17.97% 4.95% 7.76% 8.67% 9.49%
30  Rubber & Plastics  1.74% 1.06  29.07% 8.56% 13.25%  14.73% 16.05%
32  Stone, Clay & Glass  1.49% 1.17 8.78% 2.30% 3.64%  4.08% 4.48%
33  Primary Metals  0.27% 1.13  2.10% 0.53% 0.85%  0.95% 1.05%
34  Fabricated Metals  1.53% 1.07 21.79% 6.14% 9.58%  10.69% 11.68%
35  Machinery 3.00% 1.05  59.91% 22.46% 32.88%  35.95% 38.55%
36  Electrical & Electronic  3.82% 1.23 16.62% 4.54% 7.14%  7.98% 8.73%
37  Transportation Equipment  2.33% 1.15 15.51% 4.21% 6.63%  7.41% 8.11%
38  Instruments 2.25% 1.04  56.26% 20.38% 30.09% 32.98% 35.44%
  Average of All  2.28% 1.27  23.55% 7.69% 11.59% 12.80% 13.84%
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Table 2 
Results from Simulations 
 
β=0.95 θ=1.05 κ=25 σ=0.75 
 Monopoly Bertrand  Collusion  Optimum
no. of R&D firms  J=1  J=2  J=5  J=10 J=100  J=2  J=5  J=10 J=100   
R&D  labor  3.00%  2.99% 2.98% 2.98% 2.97% 3.56% 4.05% 4.26% 4.46% 12.58% 
%  optimal  23.86%  23.76% 23.68% 23.65% 23.63% 28.31% 32.20% 33.83% 35.48% 100.00% 
expected  utility  90.65  90.61 90.58 90.57 90.57 92.03 93.09 93.51 93.90 99.60 
%  welfare  loss  -8.98%  -9.02% -9.05% -9.06% -9.07% -7.60% -6.53% -6.12% -5.72%  0.00% 
avg.  growth  rate  2.64%  2.63% 2.63% 2.62% 2.62% 2.95% 3.18% 3.28% 3.36% 4.78% 
 
β=0.90 θ=1.05 κ=25 σ=0.75  
   Monopoly Bertrand  Collusion  Optimum
no. of R&D firms  J=1 J=2  J=5  J=10  J=100 J=2  J=5  J=10  J=100    
R&D  labor  2.79% 2.78% 2.77% 2.77% 2.77% 3.31% 3.75% 3.94% 4.13%  9.44%
%  optimal  29.61% 29.47% 29.37% 29.34% 29.30% 35.06% 39.78% 41.73% 43.71%  100.00%
expected  utility  42.08 42.07 42.06 42.06 42.06 42.32 42.50 42.57 42.63  43.37
%  welfare  loss  -2.98% -2.99% -3.00% -3.01% -3.01% -2.42% -2.00% -1.84% -1.69%  0.00%
avg  growth  rate  2.51% 2.51% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.81% 3.04% 3.13% 3.22%  4.53%
 
β=0.95 θ=1.20 κ=25 σ=0.75  
   Monopoly Bertrand  Collusion  Optimum
no. of R&D firms  J=1 J=2  J=5  J=10  J=100 J=2  J=5  J=10  J=100    
R&D  labor  6.89% 6.83% 6.73% 6.70% 6.67% 9.42%  12.51%  14.20%  16.30%  22.14%
%  optimal  31.12% 30.86% 30.41% 30.27% 30.14% 42.53% 56.49% 64.14% 73.62%  100.00%
expected  utility  298.16 294.21 289.70 288.31 287.12 404.22 514.53 558.87 597.69  641.18
%  welfare  loss  -53.50% -54.11% -54.82% -55.04% -55.22% -36.96% -19.75% -12.84%  -6.78%  0.00%
avg growth rate  16.43% 16.34%  16.24%  16.21% 16.19% 18.10% 19.12% 19.43% 19.66%  19.92%
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β=0.95 θ=1.05 κ=12.5 σ=0.75  
   Monopoly Bertrand  Collusion  Optimum
no. of R&D firms  J=1 J=2  J=5  J=10  J=100 J=2  J=5  J=10  J=100    
R&D  labor  3.42% 3.39% 3.38% 3.37% 3.37% 3.80% 4.09% 4.20% 4.30%  18.67%
%  optimal  18.30% 18.17% 18.09% 18.07% 18.05% 20.35% 21.89% 22.48% 23.04%  100.00%
expected  utility  86.39 86.35 86.33 86.32 86.32 86.99 87.41 87.57 87.72  96.28
% welfare loss  -10.27% -10.31%  -10.33%  -10.34%  -10.35% -9.66%  -9.21%  -9.04%  -8.89%  0.00%
avg  growth  rate  1.74% 1.73% 1.72% 1.72% 1.72% 1.89% 2.00% 2.04% 2.08%  4.52%
 
β=0.95 θ=1.05 κ=25 σ=0.10  
   Monopoly Bertrand  Collusion  Optimum
no. of R&D firms  J=1 J=2  J=5  J=10  J=100 J=2  J=5  J=10  J=100    
R&D  labor  3.07% 3.03% 3.02% 3.01% 3.01% 3.65% 4.17% 4.38% 4.60%  14.48%
%  optimal  21.19% 20.95% 20.83% 20.80% 20.77% 25.23% 28.77% 30.27% 31.79%  100.00%
expected  utility  39.81 39.57 39.45 39.41 39.39 43.96 47.77 49.42 51.13  113.62
%  welfare  loss  -64.96% -65.17% -65.28% -65.31% -65.33% -61.31% -57.95% -56.50% -55.00%  0.00%
avg  growth  rate  2.68% 2.66% 2.65% 2.64% 2.64% 2.99% 3.24% 3.33% 3.42%  4.87%
 
β=0.95 θ=2.00 κ=25 σ=0.95  
   Monopoly Bertrand  Collusion  Optimum
no. of R&D firms  J=1 J=2  J=5  J=10  J=100 J=2  J=5  J=10  J=100    
R&D  labor  12.52% 12.32% 11.56% 11.37% 11.21% 19.16% 29.86% 37.31% 48.07%  26.14%
%  optimal  47.91% 47.15% 44.22% 43.48% 42.89% 73.31%  114.23%  142.73%  183.89%  100.00%
expected  utility  1129.84 1108.50 1094.80 1091.39 1088.69 1184.72 1189.92 1184.11 1173.16  1191.44
%  welfare  loss  -5.17% -6.96% -8.11% -8.40% -8.62% -0.56% -0.13% -0.61% -1.53%  0.00%
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